Laz

Dean From what you have said, I am assuming the reason for this is because you believe there is a risk of both cams completely unclipping at the same time. In this instance, yes, another cam or prusik (whatever type) will act as a fail safe. BUT... That control measure for that specific risk, must be measured against the actual application of that control measure, raising the risks in other areas. Specifically: The advantage of a single line to EN1891 Type A, of 11mm and true kernmantle, is required energy absorption; the ascenders will sever the sheath approaching safe limits for fall forces, and slip only 1m down the line (minimal risk of striking a branch in the fall). Such damaged ropes have full strength intact, and the climber can be lowered from the ground. Many shelled cams will slip at forces well below this, or chop the line (depending on type). This means it could slip on to the core of rope and be ineffective (as would a prusik), or worse, damage the core. An easy solution is for ascenders to have a hole under the cam to clip a small krab. This would be a simple and cheap solution to prevent the cam from opening. As on the Pantin and the old 'Clog' ascenders. In the meantime, I'm not going to worry about both cams completely failing/unclipping at the same time. It has been the misapplication and abuse of 'open throat' cams that has lead to accidents, not their proper application. They are not an 'unsafe' design. At all. And offer many solutions. Particularly in the Frog technique. But, even if the cams unclipped off of the line, they inherently want to close, and will do through inertia. I demo this on descent (without saying anything) EG. When changing over to descent on the frog with a grigri, I just open up the upper cam and let it slide down with me (as its secured to the rope through the top holes). BUT, if I descend too quickly, inertia always flicks the cam back onto the rope to arrest the descent. No-one ever picks up on this safety feature - they just laugh thinking its a crap system So, even if both cams unclip at the same time, the inertia of a freefall should clip them back on pretty smartly. All these comments are baring in mind the equipment listed at the start of this thread. This is a systems approach to compatibility, efficiency and safety.

In response to Marcs query: Gravity (as I'm sure we all realise) is one of the primary forces in the universe. Consequently, overcoming this force, especially with larger mass, requires considerable effort. It doesn't really matter how long it takes, the energy requirements are much higher than other aspects of our work. As humans, we are primarily designed to do this by standing upright and using the legs and buttocks for propulsion. To climb, we should still look to these groups as a primary means. But as things get more vertical, inevitably the arms, back and shoulders will take over. No problem for apes, as they are designed specifically for this task. We as humans are not (a scientific fact, regardless of where we think we come from....). Modern Humans are (primarily) bio-mechnically designed/evolved for walking and running, not climbing. If we do not respect these facts and principles, we can develop an imbalanced posture inducing wear and tear and eventually pain/disability. The basic principle, is that ascent takes a phenomenal amount of effort. Effort of this magnitude needs to be exercised in a way that compliments human bio-mechanical principles. It doesn't matter if its one big ascent of the day, or lots of little ones, over time, it all mounts up. Ergonomics is not about reducing effort (exercise and reasonable effort is very good for us), it is about exercising effort with as much bio-mechanical efficiency as possible, and using compenatory exercise where it isn't. Pro tree work takes up too much of our time to compensate properly with exercise, so better to concentrate more on good work technique. There are other aspects to our work where we can improve ergonomics, but it is the areas requiring most energy on a routine basis (ascent, lifting) that are the higher risks. The reason the Frog seems so easy, is because it is more efficient for the way we are designed. I hope that helps explain a little of where I'm coming from.

There are some interesting points here. What it highlights to me, is the risk of relying on what people show you for work (sales pitch, demo, competition), without entering into an instructional agreement i.e. accountability. Accountability makes sure the instructor explains and agrees the parameters of presentation with an emplyers specific undertaking, advising on suitabililty. This ensures a compensation trail for negligence. The next point is the employer/self employed being responsible for adequate risk assessment of the tools and techniques they would like to employ. Not doing so has a compensation trail for negligence. And then the moral issues. I would recommend anyone serious about work site safety (hopefully everyone), break down to their own satisfaction, exactly what it is they are trying to achieve, then seek a way of doing it with safety, simplicity and efficiency. This may require expert advice where knowledge/understanding is lacking. We should never purchase and use equipment with techniques just because it looks good or we think we can find a use for it, or because we saw someone else do something flashy with it. We need to cover all the angles. This is effective risk assessment. My concern is for those watching demos; sometimes, so many 'new' tools and techniques are being demo'd in a short space of time, without limitations, risks or adequate controls being fully explained. Couple this risk with employers/self employed that may not have the expertise to fill in the gaps and ensure accurate risk asessment and adequate controls. Don't look to demos as solutions, please. They should just be a tool to get us to think.

Hi Drew Sorry for any confusion. My explanation: - I clip the top holes of the Ascension with a Petzl amd. This is easy to rotate through the holes unlike some krabs (when clipping a pulley for RADS conversion), and has a broad surface for smooth rope running during ascent; smaller clips (they need not be rated here) of narrow diameter tend to drag and vibrate. - I then clip with a key chain type clip the top slot of the Croll to the rope also (where the Torse runs through). This is because when following the access line up through the branches, using the branches as hand and footholds, the rope can be pulled away from the Croll. - I then clip the line, with a key chain type krab, to the right leg loop of my harness as the line exits the Croll (I use the Treeflex, which has a floating leg loop ring ideal for this). Again, this is because of the potential side pull when climbing through branches e.g. you step left off a branch, where the rope runs right back to the side of the branch you came up. I'll have my colleague take a pic today/tomorrow, and post it. It won't be re-sized though. I hope that helps.

These have it pretty much covered: http://www.treemettlenexus.com/article8.html http://www.treemettlenexus.com/pdfs/facts_on_training.pdf The key to resolving this issue, is, how do we choose to define 'competence' for required roles in our industry? - Competent Climber - Competent Groundie - Competent Supervisor - Competent employer NPTC certs certainly are not it, and have been mis-sold as such.

In the Kong instructions, reference is made to a drawing of both ends of the rope secured to the trunk. Obviously, enough slack needs to be left in the line to footlock. This would mean a big runout and stop if a cam comes off. But that is what they recommend. Depending on the type of rope used, fall arrest forces could apply. A little krab in the hole under the cams is recommended to retain the rope also. Though I have seen this not to be effective. They don't recommend prusiks as back-up, or anything else. A properly applied Frog system is a safer alternative from my risk assessment. But I appreciate not many understand how to run such a system safely. Training is available though.

Tree work is an extreme environment with inherent risks. These risks are best controlled by training under those with expertise over a suitable time frame. Most would suggest a minimum of 3-5 years, before being deemed 'competent'. The current system sets no requirement or guidance for this. Only this type of committed apprenticeship is appropriate to adequately controlling the risks. I was lucky enough to be trained 1:1 for 4 yrs by a foreman who had 28yrs experience under his belt. During this time I did a YTS scheme with block release academic study and skills training culminating in a City & Guilds in Forestry and Arb. Then I did a 1 yr National Certificate combined with a 3 yr National Diploma, full time 35hrs a week. Including a 12 month on the job work placement abroad. Before I was allowed on this, I had to have 4 O'levels, and 12 months experience. If I didn't turn up to class, the local council would cut my funding, and I'd be off the course. The study involved man management, business skills, accountancy, Biology, P&D, practical skills, Plant ident etc etc Compare that to the requirements of today. No comparison.

Yes companies are to blame also. But this is linked to anyone being able to set up in business. Many of those having the worst accidents are certified competent. On inspection, clearly they are not, though they thought they were. Aspects of chainsaw training are very good. But not aerial. The emphasis is on certification. This is the major flaw of the education system. People are 'trained' to pass performance critieria, not develop expertise. When not enough pass, the standard is lowered. Educational paychecks are related to pass rates and high turnover of candidates - short courses are financially more viable. So, yes, it is the government policy ultimately at fault, for marginalising apprenticeships in favour of tick box certification which boosts statistics, and trys to shoe horn complex practical tasks only learnt over time, into paper, one off assessment. The competent certificate holders cannot be competent without supervised experience over time. These same cert holders that think they are competent, then are allowed to supervise trainees. Ridiculous. Competence is defined as Knowledge, ability, training and experience. NPTC certs, therefore, are not stand alone certs of competence. Originally they were - the FASTCo training cert was a provisional licence for 6 months. But that went out the window when Lantra SSC took over and Lantra Awards were given a commercial agenda. Again, because of reduced government funding.

More important than the ease, is the ergonomic efficiency. The body is being taught positive proprioception. That is key to avoiding MSDs through repetitive tasks.

The magnitude of the risks involved with treework, insist we get this review right. I believe the employment of a training and ed consultancy from outside industry, should be charged with a conceptual approach to the challenge. We can fill in the details. The current system is too ingrained in industry. I wonder if those that started training and ed for arb in the 60s have actually been seriously consulted? For sure, part of the problem is constantly trying to shoe horn training and ed requirements into the governments ever changing and flawed systems. UK ed is becoming an international joke. To me, the rising accidents in the arboriculture industry is a perfect showcase of how the government have got it so, so wrong in training and education - dumbing down standards and fooling everyone into thinking they are academic, at cost of apprenticeships and a solid base of industry expertise. Where serious skills are required, committment is the price of entry - enter the apprentice. We are talking about the nations natural heritage being open to abuse or lost for good, and those involved severing necks and limbs with chainsaws or falling from height. Pretty high stakes in my book. With tree issues making prime time TV recently, and obvious education failures, maybe its timely for the national press and MPs to use us as a show case - how endless legislation and certification doesn't prepare or protect people properly for the real risks of the real world? Only in arboriculture you can expect to die or be maimed because of it - the epitome of failed education policy. Hmmmm..............................

Just a point I'd like to raise Kevin: As you are a Lantra instructor and NPTC assessor, I'd say that you have a vested interest in maintaining the current system........?

Thats cheating Kevin - I showed you mine! Good to have someone of your experience contribute Dave. Tree work is pretty much the same the world over in the west, so very valid points that certainly reflect my own experience. I feel it is down to each company to determine the risks and controls for their own business. Establishing their own apprenticeship based on that undertaking, its techniques and equipment. The genralised approach to one size fits all is actually one size fits the minority. The one caveat being that those responsible for the H&S of the company, are highly competent and experienced themselves, in that company's specific undertaking. As it stands, three weeks of training and certification, and an individual can claim to be a qualified tree surgeon, set up in business, and be responsible for a trainee. The industry associations in the UK are USELESS when it comes to protecting our committment (currently 21 yrs for me) to tree work, but thats another issue. I believe the IRATA tier system concept linked to time served is the way to go. It ties trainees to a company and supervisor to get experience, whilst still allowing free movement within the industry. Level1 to Level 3. (NOT THE ACTUAL IRATA SYSTEM PERSE! THE CONCEPT). The only way to gain the complete tree worker is through time served under sound supervision. By introducing a stern test for supervisor, and insisting each team must have one, the playing field would be levelled. I'm not talking another micky mouse NPTC/Lantra short course ticket. It should be scenario, demo and question based. The assessors should be fully satisfied that the individual has the required underpinning knowledge, expertise and ability, to be responsible for others. No need for writing skills - its down to the assessors to get from the candidate what they are after, and they can record. By its very nature, it should be difficult to achieve. Because this person will be responsible for training, rescue and safety of staff on site, plus the company image, and the proper care of the trees. They will be accountable. They will sign off the trainees experience, and be subject to a complaints procedure (from public, employer, trainee). That will be an excellent, cost effective way of reducing accidents and improving the industry image with the public. The public can request that such an operative be on site, and be reassured. It will be a well paid position of course, and deservedly so. But it will be the same requirement for everyone, so no cutting corners unless such an op is not on site. A framework of updating these operatives to cascade skills and knowledge through their company programmes is a much more cost effective and company specific approach to reducing risks. Who do I make my invoice out to?

Saying that two ascenders in line on a single rope needs further back-up, is not being informative. Its mis-information, and that causes confusion. There is no 'Industry Best Practice' that says two ascenders on a single line need a friction hitch back-up. Even in the Guide to Good Laughing Practice. I can only assume you are talking about the Kong twin ascender set-up???

That is my point Mr Lofthouse - two ascenders as used in the Frog are 'back-ups' to each other. Two fully functioning ascenders in line on a single line - not one. No need to back-up two ascenders with a friction hitch. I am always careful how I word stuff. I think you need to polish up your reasoning.

I think this is relevant to the discussion: "The advantages of rope access and similar work systems do not derive from the equipment employed alone. The motive force for the system is provided by the operative. The worker and his/her equipment combine to form a machine. This machine only functions as well as the sum of its parts. The ropes and devices are essentially passive, the dynamic element is provided by the worker’s strength and skills. The worker is required to have the intelligence, as well as the strength, to work in this way. It follows that this method of working requires rigorous training, practice and assessment before the equipment investigated can be used effectively and safely." HSE contract research report CRR 364/2001. It is clear from the photos, that the climber took pride in having the latest and greatest equipment - including a safety knife and first aid kit (that looks to have been the main reason the spikes were deflected from the spine). Yet the way in which the system was put together was inappropriate. I see this often in industry, not unusually at instructor/assessor/competitor/supervisor/employer level. Probably because those roles can easily be achieved without the requirement to demonstrate a thorough understanding of the fundamentals involved in planning safe climbing and rigging systems. After all, this technique is clearly shown in the GTGCP. The question should be 'Why', when the risks were known? Who is responsible? Can we trust the integrity of the next guide?

What about it?

Hallelluilia!!!!! Pity there is no facility for using a safer SRT system (until the masters). In this respect, the comps are not being very progressive. The comps could set a benchmark for safe SRT that might feed back more positively to industry.

Another point to follow on from the above: The cause of most accidents highlight that the individual wasn't actually competent, or the technique they used wasn't actually suitable. But if they have a ticket that says they are competent, or were using a technique that was condoned in good practice guides, then the coroner or HSE can find no fault. It won't be long before perhaps a civil claim comes from a family, questioning the guidance and training systems, that really led to the accident. In this respect, I think the current framework of the trade associations and certiication system, is actually bringing the industry into disrepute. Through nothing more than their own incompetence and lack of expertise in addressing the real issues, or through pushing a path focused on vested interest. Writing these posts does nothing to further my own career in the industry - the opposite in fact. But I have been involved with accident investigations, and find the cause normally roots itself within these points. For me, it is a moral compulsion, and I understand why the industry isn't so motivated. Thats why I don't expect real change.

Good post Mr Squirrel Funny how it takes an outside view to see an answer. Firstly, it must be obvious by now that NPTCs are not tickets of competence - more people than ever hold these tickets, and more accidents than ever occur. It is a complicated system and costly. Therefore, neither is the system cost effective to industry. What is required is a simple tier system, based on roles. e.g. groundsman, climber, supervisor. And then trainee/apprentice roles for each of these. The syllabus is centred around each company's specific undertaking. Log books document experience, and are qualified by a supervisor, who's name is against the trainee. All this hinges on training supervisors, who can act as in-house instuctors. Too many incompetents are in in positions of responsibility. A new bar must be set for this level. Only true competents, or supervision by them, will reduce accidents. Unfortunately, this expertise gets thrown on the rubbish heap as routine for the industry, in favour of energetic young men who are encouraged to work like slaves, faster and faster, till they burn out by the time they get experienced. And so the cycle of diminishing returns continues. I am under no illusions though: This review is just an exercise to make us all feel we are involved. But in reality, too many have invested in the 'Ticket Trade'. The current system will remain with little real change. Accidents will continue to rise, more legislation, higher insurance permiums, etc etc etc I hold the industry responsible, through the charities that guide us, for not educating the public, not taking the initiative, and generally being reactive to any issue, instead of heading it off as it came on the horizon. The wrong people with limited expertise, are constantly allowed to decide the industry's future, for their commercial gain. No true democracy in arboriculture. No vision - no future. The status Quo will prevail.

I find it interesting that competitions are recommended as updating, when comps popularised the technique in the first place. Techniques and equipment used in competition are not necessarily appropriate to the work site. The ITCC events are an extreme sport. I like them for that, but they are not often appropriate for resolving professional risks.

That is correct. Plus the rope can be easily secured to single ascenders, including the chest ascender, by clipping the top holes. The rope can also be retained by clipping below.

Exactly. It wouldn't have happened with a properly set up Frog system. The main point is that this technique was allowed in the GTGCP, and is even recommended for rescue??? The second point is that the technique is still considered acceptable, after so many known near-misses/accidents using it. By the time back-up measures are installed, you could have installed a much safer single line system. Even with back-ups there would still remain a question to their effectiveness, and other risks (to the twin ascender technique) would still remain. The technique is not 'Double Rope Technique' (DRT) as stated. It is still a single line, but doubled. DRT is two separate lines independently anchored. If the climber was using DRT, he probably wouldn't have fallen. "The HSE found no-one at fault" A bit rich that. How about themselves or the authors for condoning the technique in GTGCP. Next we'll be told the same authors are responsible for the GTGCP review

IMHO, there are flaws in assessing risk and applying dependable controls in some of these responses. It is down to each company to assess the risks of their own undertaking, and justify their own control measures. It also means accepting the severe consequences of getting it wrong. Regulations and industry 'Good Practice' guides (not appropriately named - as the twin ascender accident proves) cannot possibly cover work site risks and specific applications of a safety system. My advice - learn the FACTUAL fundamentals and limitations of ALL the items in your safety system, and research if they are safely compatible. What may appear a fully functional back-up, may not work in reality, if the limitations are not properly researched. A true back-up is a totally separate system and anchor. Unfortunately these are practicable exceptions rather than a rule for tree work.

Not much to go on here: 1. Are you saying that you were secured on a single line, with only one ascender? 2. And that ascender 'failed' and you hit the ground? 3. Was the ascender clipped to the rope through the top holes? 4. Did the spring fail? 5. What rope were you using? 6. What ascender were you using? 7. Were you using two in-line ascenders on a single rope, and both failed at the same time, causing you to fall? 8. Or were you using a 'twin' ascender on a doubled line? Ascenders are tested and rated as 'primary protection' pieces of PPE for single line ascent, to EN industrial standards. Of course we should rely on them, but only when there are two, to act as redundancy to a possible failure. Friction hitches are of a very variable nature, are not inherently safer than ascenders, or any more dependable as a method of secure attachment.